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Oil pipelines are no ordinary assets, and their security is of utmost importance
especially in a country like Nigeria where oil pipelines are the major means
of transporting crude oil. Nigeria relies on this means of transportation,
which has been the victim of various physical attacks over the years by vandals
and militant groups. This has affected the transportation of crude oil, which
isthe most important resource sustaining the Nigerian economy, putting it in
jeopardy. This article appraises the efficacy of relevant Nigerian legislation
providing for oil pipelines security; highlights the weaknesses of the current
regulatory arrangement, and suggests legal reforms to make oil transportation
through pipelines efficient, effective and secure in Nigeria. These reforms
include the need to have a comprehensive legislation on oil pipeline security;
the need to review relevant legislation providing for the security of oil pipelines
in Nigeria; proper funding of the security agencies saddled with the overall
responsibility for managing as well as safeguarding the pipelines to ensure
their productivity; and overhauling the entire security apparatus put in place
to protect oil pipelines in Nigeria by having a sustainable and strategic
approach to dealing with oil pipeline insecurity.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The importance of oil pipelines in an economy that is heavily dependent
on crude oil, like Nigeria, cannot be overemphasized. Nigeria is the
largest oil producer in Africa and fourth biggest exporter of liquefied
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natural gas (LNG) in 2015.1 Oil pipelines are the major means of
transporting crude oil in many countries, Nigeria inclusive; hence they
are important to Nigerian oil production.2 The pipelines generally
distribute the fuel needed for daily activities acrossNigeria. Therefore,
they are valuable tothe physical and economic output of the nation.3
Together with the products they carry, pipelines help to provide economic
growth to the various communities across the country where they are
laid by providing jobs around their maintenance and service.4 Some of
the advantages of transporting oil through pipelines include safety,
stability, lower cost, and higher efficiency. Observably, where this mode
of transportation is disrupted, it is bound to cause a major setback to
the surrounding communities and to the nation at large,given the
reliance on this infrastructure.
The security of oil pipelines then becomes an important issue in
this context. Oil is without question, one of the main pillars on which
Nigeria’s economy currently stands. Crude oil being the major source of
Nigeria’s national income, as well as a key product for the export market,
it needs to be properly protected and managed. Over the years, there
have been recurrent issues over pipeline vandalism in different parts of
the country, especially in the Niger Delta region, translating into financial
losses sometimes running into several billions of dollars.5 According to
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), 700,000 barrels of
crude oil per day (bpd) were lost in 2016 to pipeline sabotage.6
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This article examines the nature of, and legal solutions to, the
problem of oil pipeline insecurity in Nigeria. After discussing the
importance of pipeline security to the Nigerian petroleum sector, it
discusses challenges such as the high rate of pipeline vandalism,
terrorism, sabotage, poor quality pipeline and inadequate legislation
in securing the pipelines. To protect oil pipelines, which are critical
national infrastructures, well thought out solutions to the problem of
pipeline, vandalism and general insecurity of Nigerian oil pipelines
must be addressed. The ultimate aim of this article is to examine how
challenges inhibiting the safety of pipelines can be addressed. It reviews
the existing laws and makes recommendations relating to pipeline
security in Nigeria. Modern methods of dealing with pipeline security
and the need for appropriate funding of the regulatory institutions
saddled with the overall responsibility of managing the pipelines
toensure their effectiveness is advocated for. There is also a needto
overhaul the outdated legal framework on oil pipeline security to make
them more focused and responsive.
This article is divided into five sections. After this introduction,
section 2 examines the need for a holistic legal and institutional
framework on oil pipeline security in Nigeria. Section 3 discusses the
nature, scope and manifestations of pipeline insecurity in Nigeria. It
appraises the legal barriers and gaps to promoting oil pipeline security
in Nigeria. Section 4 discusses law and governance approaches to
improving pipeline security in Nigeria. The article concludes in
section 5.
2. THE NIGERIAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY AND
THE NEED FOR PIPELINE SECURITY
The birth of the petroleum industry in Nigeria followed the discovery
of crude oil in commercial quantity in Oloibiri in 1956.7 Since then, the
Nigeria economy has been more or less dependent on petroleum.8 To
facilitate the distribution of crude oil from the oil-rich Nigeria Delta to
other parts of the country, a network of oil pipelines was constructed
7 For a discussion of the history of oil and gas production in Nigeria, see Damilola
Olawuyi, Principles of Nigerian Environmental Law (Afe Babalola University Press,
2015) 2-25.
8 Ibid.
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to inter-link some states at strategic locations.9 Nigeria has a total
pipeline grid of 5001 kilometres.10 This consists of 4315 kilometres of
multiproduct pipelines and 666 kilometres of crude oil pipelines.11
These pipelines cut across the country, forming a network that links
the 22 petroleum storage depots; the four refineries at, Port-Harcourt
(I and II), Kaduna, and Warri; the off-shore terminals at Bonny and
Escravos; and the jetties at Atlas Cove, Calabar, Okirika and Warri.12
This system of oil pipelines is used to transport crude oil to the refineries,
covering a total distance of 719 kilometres.13 The multi-product pipelines
transport products from the refineries/import receiving jetties to the
22 petroleum storage depots located in various parts of the country.
The storage infrastructure consisting of 22 loading depots linked by
pipeline of various diameters has aggregate installed capacities of
1,266,890 (PMS), 676,400 (DPK), 1,007,900 (AGO), and 74,000 (ATK)
cubicmetre tonnes.14
Pipeline insecurity is driven mainly by themalicious or intentional
destruction of pipelines, platforms, loading bays and other facilities
for selfish purpose. Meanwhile, oil theft is the illegal taking away of oil
by whatever means and diverting for personal benefit. The hacking
into pipelines to steal crude oil to refine later and sell abroad is illegal
bunkering. Pipeline vandalism is the intentional destruction of pipelines,
platforms loading barge and other facilities for selfish interest. It is an
illicit trade that involves the theft of crude oil and its derivative products
through a variety of mechanisms.15 Asuni16 refers to illegal bunkering
as oil taken from pipelines or flow stations, as well as extra crude oil
added to legitimate cargo that is not accounted for.
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Nigeria is largely dependent on crude oil17 as its main source of
foreign exchange. This makes crude oil and its derivatives paramount
for the continued existence of the nation. Unfortunately, a lot of this
resource is wasted and lost to vandals, criminals and oil thieves in
huge sums, daily.18 The rate of vandalism in the Niger Delta region is
on the increase,putting at stake Nigeria’s economic mainstay. Currently,
over 800,000 barrels of crude oil per day is lost to pipeline vandalism,
oil bunkering and so on due to the general climate of insecurity around
the oil pipelines. Nigeria’s oil production, as projected in the 2016
budget targeted 2.2 million barrels per day, but now the target is 1.4
million barrels per day.19
Efforts made by the federal government to improve the security of
the pipelines include hiring private security firms, equipping men and
officers of the Nigerian armed forces to protect government facilities.
These, however, has not put an end to the high rate of pipeline
destruction and other oil facilities. In fact, criminal cartels with
international connections have been formed.20 One outcome of this is
that the significant investment devoted to pipeline security remains
unaccountable for and the method of security is deemed ineffective.
For instance, statistics show that Nigeria is losing as much as 400,000
barrels of oil per day.21
This common trend of illegal bunkering in Nigeria is overwhelming.
It is not only limited to unauthorized bunkering and loading of ships
but includes theft, diversion and smuggling of oil. Illegal bunkering is
the most common form of oil theft, and it involves direct tapping of oil
through pipeline puncture or rupture.22 It has now become a source of
livelihood for some who regularly rupture pipelines and use the stolen
crude oil for shipping business without required approvals, permits,
licenses or valid documents, or in violation of the federal government
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guidelines. These are the issues this article seeks to address by
proffering solutions that could help to secure the pipelines by paying
more attention to the legal framework.
Against the above background, this article advocates the need for
a comprehensive legal and institutional framework onpipelines security
in Nigeria. It emphasizes the need for an agency of the government to
manage the security of oil pipelines and coordinate activities of relevant
security agencies as regards securing oil pipelines. A solid legal
framework also enhances efficiency in the oil sector and improves the
inflow of foreign direct investment into the oil industry.
3. CAUSES AND MANIFESTATIONS OF OIL PIPELINE
INSECURITY IN NIGERIA
The Nigerian petroleum industry with the pipeline system currently in
place faces challenges specifically on the prevalence of militancy and
oil pipeline vandalism in the Niger Delta. While the former has
significantly attenuated in the aftermath of the amnesty deal of 2009,23
the latter appears to have escalated both in incidence and impact.
According to Ogbeni,24 16,083 pipeline breaks were recorded within
the last 10 years adding that while 398 pipeline breaks representing
2.4 percent were due to ruptures, the activities of unpatriotic vandals
accounted for 15,685 (about 97.5 percent) of those cases.25 We now
focus attention on some notable challenges in order to unpack the
scope and manifestations of oil pipeline insecurity in Nigeria.
3.1 Vandalism of Oil Pipelines
Vandalism affects adversely the oil companies, government, and even
the environment. Vandalism is an action involving deliberate destruction
of public or private property.26 According to the 2013 Annual Report of
the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), Nigeria
lost US$10.9 billion to oil theft between 2009 and 2011.27 In the 1990s,
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vandals, mainly unemployed youths operating in remote areas and
communities through which oil pipeline pass, punctured the pipes or
took advantage of ruptured or leaking pipes to syphon fuel or other
petroleum products into drums, plastic containers or storage cans for
sale on the black market.
The technology employed was quite rudimentary, involving the use
of funnels, drilling tools and plastic hoses to syphon the products.
Also, only a few cases of vandalism occurred. For instance, in 1995,
there were only seven reported cases of vandalism, and in the next
three years 33, 34, and 57 cases were recorded.28 Towards the end of
the military rule in Nigeria, the vandalism of oil pipelines, especially
the pipelines for premium motor spirit (PMS), came into the limelight.
In recent times, pipeline vandalism has assumed an alarming rate
mainlybecause of the increase in the frequency of attacks on these
pipelines and the increased sophistication of the technology used.29
3.2 Pipeline Ruptures
This is another important challenge that affects the security of oil
pipelines. It is a major contributor to oil spill incidents. Corrosion of
pipes and tanks involves the rupturing or leaking of production
infrastructure that is “very old and lack regular inspection and
maintenance”.30 Corrosion plays a major role in oil spills because of
the small size of the oilfields in the Niger Delta. Moreover, there is an
extensive network of pipelines between the fields as well as numerous
small networks of flow lines allowing many opportunities for leaks.31
In onshore areas, most pipelines and flow lines are laid above the
ground.32 Pipelines, which have an estimatedlife span of about 15 years,
are old and susceptible to corrosion.
3.3 Pipeline Damages and Sabotage
Deliberate sabotaging and the damage of pipelines are compromises
to the security of oil pipelines. Pipelines also are sources of spills,
leaks, and fires. Some pipelines are used beyond their life span.33
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Environmental pollution caused by oil pipeline spills could result from
human factors to material defects: pipe corrosion, ground erosion,
tectonic movements on the bottom, and encountering ship anchors
and bottom trawls. Indeed pipeline defects could be the source of
small but gradual to long-term leakage or leakage that might lead to
an abrupt explosion.
In Nigeria, interfering with oil pipelines and installations has
assumed huge dimensions and a variety of forms. There are three major
identifiable forms, namely, illegal oil bunkering, oil pipeline vandalism
and scooping, and oil terrorism. Compared to oil bunkering and pipeline
vandalism, oil terrorism34 is a new vocabulary introduced by security
analysts and scholars to describe the deliberate attack on pipeline
systems in Iraq and elsewhere in the world by militias, freedom fighters,
and insurgents.
The penalty for the offence of sabotaging oil pipelines in Nigeria is
a very serious one. Section 2 of the Petroleum Production and
Distribution (Anti-Sabotage) Act Cap. P12 LFN 2004 provides that if a
person is convicted, he is to be sentenced either to death or to a
maximum term of 21 years imprisonment. The provision of this Act is
stringent enough to constitute a deterrent to would-be economic
saboteurs. It is doubtful, however, if this provision has ever been
enforced.
3.4  Illegal Oil Bunkering
Nigeria’s most profitable illegal private business in the petroleum
industry is illegal oil bunkering. Bunkering is the process of filling a
ship with oil (or coal). Illegal oil bunkering, therefore, is a euphemism
for oil theft.35 It involves tapping crude oil straight from the pipelines.
Illegal oil bunkering is a dangerous process that persists in the creeks
of the Niger Delta where oil pipelines form a grid.
Stealing oil from pipelines in the creeks involves building a
temporary enclosure around a small portion of the underwater pipe,
pumping out water from the enclosure, drilling a hole into the steel
casing of the pipe through which the crude passes, and fitting the hole
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with a pipe and control valve.36 The creek water is then allowed to
flow back and fill the enclosure so that the set-up is underwater and,
therefore, hidden from oil company inspectors.37 When crude oil is
being pumped through the pipelines, sometimes at a pressure of 600
pounds per square inch (psi), the thieves are able to fill up to a 1,000
metric tonne barge within hours.38 The barge is afterwards moved
offshore to a shipused for transportation and the oil sold on the high
seas.39 Illegal oil bunkering also involves tapping directly into pipelines
at a site removed from oil company facilities and connecting the pipes
to barges that are hidden in small creeks under the cover of mangrove
forests.40 It is said that over 10 per cent of the oil exported from Nigeria
every year is actually illegally bunkered.41 Oil bunkering is now an
activity that does not necessarily require the assistance of oil company
staff to operate the equipment at the wellheads or allow access.42
3.5  Oil Terrorism
Oil terrorism is the latest of the ills plaguing the Nigerian oil industry.
It involves such acts as the blowing up of oil pipelines, installations
and platforms with explosives; and the seizure of oil barges, oil wells,
flow stations, support vessels, and other oil facilities in order to prevent
the exploitation and/or distribution of crude oil or its refined products.43
The first act of oil terrorism can be traced to December 2005, when the
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) blew up
Shell’s Opobo Pipeline in Delta State.44
In September 2005, after the arrest of Alhaji Asari Dokubo,45 militant
groups in the Delta region instructed all multinational oil companies
to leave the region, as they were preparing for a war with the Nigerian
government. Since then militants in the region, seeking to control a
greater share of the nation’s oil wealth, have adopted a terrorist strategy
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to impair the capacity of the petroleum industry to export crude oil. By
doing so, they hoped that the federal government would lose the
substantial revenue needed to sustain the machinery of government,
and so be forced to meet their political, economic, and environmental
demands of their people.46
3.6 Inadequate Legal Framework on Oil Pipeline
Security and Weak Enforcement
Another key problem in this critical sector of the economy is the lack
of diligent enforcement of extant laws that speak to the problem of
pipeline destruction and sabotage. For example, Section 1 of the
Petroleum Products and Distribution (Anti-Sabotage) Act of 1975
outlaws sabotage, i.e. the willful act of destroying, damaging, or
obstructing petroleum installations and transportation infrastructure,
thereby hindering petroleum production and distribution processes.47
This Act makes the willful obstruction or prevention of petroleum
production and distribution an offence in Nigeria.48
The Act criminalizes all acts that disrupt petroleum production
and distribution such as pipe vandalism, blow-ups, obstruction of
petroleum production or distribution; obstruction of the procurement
of petroleum products; or the obstruction of vehicles distributing
petroleum products such as motor spirits, gas oil, diesel oil, automotive
gas oil, fuel oil,aviation fuel, kerosene, liquefied petroleum gases and
any lubricating oil or greases or other lubricant. Under this Act, the
offence of sabotage is punishable by a death penalty or aterm of
imprisonment not exceeding 21 years.49 This Act seeks to punish the
principal offender, as well as anyone who aids, incites, counsels or
procures any other person, to commit an act of sabotage, whether or
not that other person actually does the act in question or not. Although
the blow-up and vandalization of petroleum distribution pipelines, a
principal cause of oil spillage in the Niger Delta, has been outlawed by
this Act, onlya few arrests and prosecutions have ever been carried out
under this law. Lack of committed enforcement of this anti-sabotage
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legislation has resulted in a culture of impunity in the Niger Delta
region. To ensure oil pipeline security in Nigeria, all cases of pipeline
sabotage must be thoroughly investigated, while full criminal penalties
prescribed by the law must be applied in all proven cases.
Another problem is that there is no single comprehensive, specific
law dealing with oil pipeline security in Nigeria. An examination of
Nigerian legal framework on pipelines laws reveals that they only have
provisions that relate to the general management of oil pipelines and
those provisions that give limited roles to organizations such as the
Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) to secure oil
pipelines. Although relevant laws exist that relate to the general
management of oil pipelines, none of them comprehensively addresses
the key causes of, and provide solutions to, the problem of pipeline
insecurity in Nigeria.50
For instance, while sabotage is addressed in existing laws, none of
the laws addresses other causes of pipeline insecurity such as negligent
construction, accidental ruptures, oil terrorism and illegal bunkering.
Considering the critical roles that oil pipelines play in Nigeria’s oil-
dependent economy, and in the oil and gas industry, there should be a
separate law that deals solely with the all-important issue of pipeline
security in the country. There is a need for a focused and committed
effort towards ensuring that issues relating to pipeline security are
squarely and elaborately dealt with.
4.  PROMOTING PIPELINE SECURITY IN NIGERIA
Given the strategic importance of pipelines in Nigeria and the potential
threat to its security, certain urgent steps should be taken to address
issues revolving around the security of pipelines. These are discussed
in the subsequent sub-sections.
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4.1 The Need for Legal Provisions on Pipeline
Integrity Methods
The need toprovide for pipeline integrity methods in our laws will
certainly help reduce cases of pipeline corrosion. Pipeline integrity
methods include visual inspection, depth of cover survey, External Non-
Destructive Testing (NDT), cathodic protection monitoring, coating
disbandment and damage survey, hydrostatic testing, geometry In-Line
Inspection (ILI) tools, and ultrasonic in-line inspection tools.51 The
pipeline network must be rigorously tested to ensure that they meet
safety guidelines. When detected, these defects can be repaired.
These procedures help identify specific types of defects, such as,
corrosion: the wastage or thinning of the pipe wall due to a chemical
or electrochemical attack; gouging: the mechanical removal of metal
from a local area on the surface of the pipe; metallurgical anomalies
like hard spots, laminations, slivers, scabs and inclusions, and cracks
due to fatigue stress corrosion and weld defects. Notably, hydrostatic
testing is the predominant method for ascertaining the strength and
reliability of a pipeline section that may be put into active service.52
4.2 Need for Indigenous Companies to Operate Oil
Pipelines
Supporting indigenous oil companies to operate and manage oil
pipelines could encourage effective participation of Nigerians, especially
the local residents along the pipeline routes are located, in developing
community surveillance initiatives to protect oil pipelines. When local
communities invest in or operate pipelines in their communities, it
gives them agreater sense of belonging, therefore motivating them to
protect their investments from destruction. Endogenous ownership of
pipelines could also lead to employment opportunities for local residents
and in the long run reduce sabotage and other destructive activities.
To participate in oil pipeline development activities, indigenous
companies can apply under the Oil Pipelines Act (OPA)53 to the Minister
of Petroleum Resources who has the authority to grant “permits to
survey routes for oil pipelines” and “licenses to construct, maintain
and operate oil pipelines”54 for their licences and permits. The OPA
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allows any person to make an application to the Minister for a permit
to survey for oil pipelines.55 In fact, many highly profitable indigenous
oil companies operate in different parts of the Niger Delta.
Nigeria enacted the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content
Development Act, 2010, which encourages the development of Nigerian
content in the Nigerian oil and gas industry.56 The Act provides that:
Nigerian independent operators shall be given first consideration
in the award of oil blocks, oil field licences, oil lifting licences
and in all projects for which contract is to be awarded in the
Nigerian oil and gas industry subject to the fulfilment of such
conditions as may be specified by the Minister.57
This provision states that indigenous oil companies will be given
first consideration where the award of contracts to maintain oil pipelines
is carried out so far as they meet the specifications provided for by the
minister of petroleum resources.
4.3 Proper Funding and the need for Requisite
Technology to Secure Oil Pipelines
Relevant security agencies such as the Nigerian military, the police and
the NSCDC need to be well-equipped tosecure the pipeline networks
in Nigeria effectively. Proper funding of the security agencies motivates
them to carry out their responsibilities efficiently. A major challenge
that usually inhibits their effectiveness is corruption. Security agents
can be easily bribed and made to compromise pipeline security. A good
remuneration package could make them more effective in their
surveillance work.
Moreover, the security agencies protecting critical infrastructure
such as oil pipelines should also have the latest technology to protect
the pipelines. Oil pipelines are long and cover great distances. Use of
drone technology would be appropriate for the surveillance of these
oil pipelines. We also cannot overstate the need for all security agencies
to collaborate to rid the nation of oil theft. The government should
givestrong encouragement to this. Finally, since Nigeria is not the only
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oil-producing country in the world, the government should learn best
practices from the developed countries so as to overcome hindrances
of this nature once and for all.
4.4 Need for Regulation Covering Location or Citation
of Pipelines
Pipelines are usually vulnerable to vandalism, sabotage and terrorist
attack with firearms, explosives and other physical means.58 Pipelines
are also known to be vulnerable to cyber-attacks.59 In Colombia, for
example, rebels havebombed the Caño Limón oil pipeline and other
pipelines over 950 times since 1993.60 In 1996, the London police
reportedly foiled a plot by the Irish Republican Army to bomb gas
pipelines and other utilities across the city of London.61 Nigerian
militants also attacked pipelines and related facilities, including the
bombing of three oil pipelines in May 2007.62 Moreover, a Mexican
rebel group reportedly detonated bombs along Mexican oil and natural
gas pipelines in July and September 2007.63
Nigeria must take a cue from the advanced countries by ensuring
that pipelines are not located inplaces of high population density where
many lives could be lost in case of an explosion or some form of attack.
4.5 Need for a Comprehensive Law on Oil Pipeline
Security in Nigeria
Existing laws on the security of oil pipelines cannot be left scattered in
different statutes as is the case currently. There is an immediate need
for an all-encompassing law to deal with this issue of security of oil
pipelines squarely. This comprehensive law will have detailed provisions
on oil pipeline security and provide for an agency to implement the
provisions of this law religiously. The law should also harmonize the
punishments for violating the security of pipelines as contained in
2017 LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROMOTING OIL PIPELINE SECURITY 223
several other laws in Nigeria. This calls for a reform of existing laws on
oil pipelines security. Thelaw creating a new agency of government
with sole responsibility for oil pipelines security in Nigeria should grant
adequate power to do its job well. This agency must be well funded
and equipped with the right technology to effectively monitor and secure
the pipelines. The agency can utilize a multi-agency approach to
coordinate activities of several relevant security agencies and other
stakeholders (especially the oil companies) for operational efficiency.
4.6 Need for a Structured “Multi-Agency Security
Response Approach (MASRA)” to Oil Pipeline
Security in Nigeria
The Multi-Agency Security Response Approach (MASRA) simply implies
the coming together of all relevant security agencies in a formal and
organized manner to deal with all issues relating to oil pipelines security
in Nigeria. This approach can be backed up by an Act of the Nigerian
National Assembly or may result into an agency created by the federal
government to deal with oil pipelines security issues. This was the
approach that government used to deal with corruption when it created
the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC). Top officers of these
agencies were recruited from the police, customs and similar security
formations in the country. This approach will ensure proper
coordination of efforts and the sharing of intelligence to deal with
every kind of sabotage of the oil infrastructure. Organizations such as
the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Police; Nigeria Security and Civil Defence
Corps and other relevant security organizations would be needed for
this approach to be successful. We cannot overemphasize that these
security agencies must be properly funded, and they must have requisite
skills and technology at their disposal.
5. CONCLUSION
Oil is strategic to the Nigerian economy, and oil pipelines which are
used for the transportation oil and gas resources must be safe, secure
and well protected. Challenges relating to pipeline security in Nigeria,
specifically those identified in this article, can be surmounted with
strong determination by all the stakeholders. However, practical
problems such as lack of political will; unemployment; poverty;
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corruption and general insecurity must also be dealt with head-on for
oil pipeline insecurity to become a thing of the past. Issues surrounding
security must not be taken lightly especially given the pivotal importance
of the petroleum industry to the Nigerian economy and society.
